##### Assignment Instructions

1. Suppose that workers have 4 levels of productivity in a labor market. High productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, low productivity is 2, and trump productivity is negative 10. The distribution of workers is 1/8 high, 1/4 medium, 1/2 low, and 1/8 trump. The value of time in leisure is half of labor market productivity. Find the equilibrium wage. Is there adverse selection? 2. Let U=w-e where U is utility, w is wage, and e denotes effort. Profits are q-w, where q is output. Effort is zero or 10. If e=10, q=100 with probability 0.8 and q=0 with probability 0.2. If e=0, q=100 with probability 0.4 and q=0 with probability 0.6. The principle has an outside option of 20 and the agent has an outside option of 30. What is the equilibrium contract? 3. Suppose that high productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, and low productivity is 2. Each type constitutes 1/3 of the labor market. The education signal can be zero or one. The cost of signaling is 20e divided by productivity. What is the equilibrium? Is it separating, semi-separating, or pooling?.

1. Suppose that workers have 4 levels of productivity in a labor market. High productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, low productivity is 2, and trump productivity is negative 10.  The distribution of workers is 1/8 high, 1/4 medium, 1/2 low, and 1/8 trump. The value of time in leisure is half of labor market productivity. Find the equilibrium wage. Is there adverse selection?
2. Let U=w-e where U is utility, w is wage, and e denotes effort. Profits are q-w,  where q is output.  Effort is zero or 10. If e=10, q=100  with probability 0.8 and q=0  with probability 0.2. If e=0,  q=100 with probability 0.4 and q=0   with probability 0.6.  The principle has an outside option of 20 and the agent has an outside option of 30. What is the equilibrium contract?
3. Suppose that high productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, and low productivity is 2.  Each type constitutes 1/3 of the labor market. The education signal can be zero or one. The cost of signaling is 20e divided by productivity. What is the equilibrium? Is it separating, semi-separating, or pooling?

1. Suppose that workers have 4 levels of productivity in a labor market. High productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, low productivity is 2, and trump productivity is negative 10. The distribution of workers is 1/8 high, 1/4 medium, 1/2 low, and 1/8 trump. The value of time in leisure is half of labor market productivity. Find the equilibrium wage. Is there adverse selection? 2. Let U=w-e where U is utility, w is wage, and e denotes effort. Profits are q-w, where q is output. Effort is zero or 10. If e=10, q=100 with probability 0.8 and q=0 with probability 0.2. If e=0, q=100 with probability 0.4 and q=0 with probability 0.6. The principle has an outside option of 20 and the agent has an outside option of 30. What is the equilibrium contract? 3. Suppose that high productivity is 10, medium productivity is 6, and low productivity is 2. Each type constitutes 1/3 of the labor market. The education signal can be zero or one. The cost of signaling is 20e divided by productivity. What is the equilibrium? Is it separating, semi-separating, or pooling?

Price (USD)
\$

## Solved!

### Why Choose Us For Your Assignment?

##### Privacy

We value all our customers' privacy. For that reason, all information stays private and confidential and will never be shared with third parties.

##### Punctuality

With our service you will never miss a deadline. We use strict follow-ups with our writers to ensure that all papers are submitted on time.

##### Authenticity

We have no tolerance for plagiarism. All papers go through thorough checking to ensure that no assignments contain plagiarism.

##### Money Back

You feel unsatisfied with your results? No worries. We offer refunds to our customers if any paper is not written according to the instructions.

### Clients Love Us Client #121678
This is by far the best I have ever scored in a custom essay. I am surprised the writer handled this assignment so well despite the short notice. I will definitely use your service next time. Client #21702
When I was recommended to you by my friends, I wasn't sure you could deliver excellent results for Masters research papers until I submitted my first order. I am all yours now. Client #20730
Excellent Services! You are the only assignment helper I can rely on. I have worked with many before and your services are exceptional. I have recommended you to my friends and the results are similar. Client #20387   